There was no need for China to change the red carpets. No sooner were the state dishes cleaned after President Trump left Beijing, President Vladimir Putin savored his own Peking duck and pumpkin pastries, according to Tass.

Aside from the pleasantries, the Russian leader signed with President Xi Jinping more than 40 cooperation agreements as the two heralded their growing strategic ties. But most important is what did not happen.

After years of trying, Putin again failed to lock down Chinese approval of the long-delayed Power of Siberia 2 natural gas pipeline. Xi appeared to be just as tough a bargainer with Putin as he was with Trump.

China needs more energy, especially with its Middle East sources bottled up due to the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran and the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. But even so, China is still stalling on a pipeline project that has been in the works since a Putin visit in 2006. Ever since, China has been mulling whether to deepen its energy ties with Russia while seeking to diversify its supply with long-term, low-cost deals beyond the Middle East.

For Russia, the pipeline would be critical since its capacity would be nearly that of Nord Stream 1, one of Russia’s critical pipelines to Europe. Nord Stream 1 has been mothballed since 2022 due to the Ukraine war and sabotage. Russia could use the revenues, especially after its mounting loses in Ukraine.

For China, the gas supplied by Power of Siberia 2 would not only help power its economy but also decrease the country’s dependence on polluting coal. But China apparently does not want to be dependent on Russian energy any more than Europe now does, or so it seems.

Despite the failure to finalize a deal on the pipeline, the Putin trip was full of fanfare and salutes. The two presidents extended a friendship treaty first signed in 2001.

But the relationship has its limits, and it represents a complete turnaround from the Chinese Communist Party’s dependence on Joseph Stalin to finance, train and arm its revolutionary army in the 1940s. After they cooperated during the Korean War, ideological tensions between the two countries began to simmer with Stalin’s death. There were sporadic border tensions which finally led to President Nixon’s trip to China in 1972, and a triangular relationship developed between the United States, the Soviet Union and China.

That triangle still exists to a degree, and Russia and China have competing claims in Central Asia and the Arctic. Today China is the superior partner because of its economic strength, pipeline or no pipeline.

Never has a country so small cast so large a shadow as Cuba did during the Cold War. At least not in modern history.

Fidel Castro’s revolution took the world to the nuclear brink during the Cuban missile crisis. Through the 1960s, Cuban troops and Cuban-backed guerrillas fought in Bolivia, Algeria, Venezuela and the Congo. Che Guevara became the symbol of youthful revolt around the world.

Despite its failed early efforts to spread revolution, Cuba’s ambitions only grew. In 1973, Cuba sent combat troops and tank brigades to Syria. Two years later, it deployed some 50,000 troops to Angola, assisting local Communist forces against U.S.- and South African-backed rebels. Its fight with South Africa helped lead to the establishment of Namibia. Another 17,000 troops were sent to Ethiopia to back the brutal Mengistu regime against invading Somalia in the late 1970s.

At the same time Cuba was backing revolution in Central America, coaxing the five Salvadoran guerrilla groups to unite and train there. Successful revolutions in Nicaragua and Grenada, both with ample Cuban support, appeared to show Havana on the march — until the Grenada revolution self-imploded and the Sandinistas lost an election in 1990.

The impact of Cuba’s foreign policy — nearly always backed if not encouraged by the Soviet Union — now appears ephemeral. But the extent of Cuba’s involvement abroad — including sending doctors around the world — now also appears fantastical given the shape Cuba now finds itself in.

Without the support of the now-defunct Soviet Union and Venezuela, Cuba has run out of fuel. Russia and China are standing pat. Even Mexico, long a supporter but now under U.S. pressure, has eliminated its oil shipments. The lights are out most of the day in Havana. City streets are full of garbage. Store shelves are empty. The full grip of Washington’s long trade embargo — originating with the Eisenhower Administration — has reached a crescendo.

There are reports the United States is preparing to indict Raul Castro, Fidel’s brother and still the ultimate power on the island although he is well into his 90s. While Washington insists Cuba shuts Russian and Chinese listening posts on the island, there is the possibility American troops could scoop up Castro as they did Venezuela’s Nicolas Maduro in January. Who would take over if the revolution crumbles?

The Cuban revolution is on life support, and is no longer a threat to anyone. Or is it? Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said over the weekend that the biggest threat Cuba now poses is internal collapse, leading to a massive humanitarian and migration crisis.

Cuba offers many lessons. One is that countries overextend themselves at their own risk. After Venezuela and Iran, is the Trump Administration ready for another Mariel boat lift that flooded Miami with refugees in the early 1980s?

It’s a tantalizing thought. President Trump needs help to get out of his Iran mess. President Xi Jinping is committed to uniting China with Taiwan, which he considers a renegade province. A Trump gesture suggesting that Taiwan should eventually be part of a united China would be a big victory for Xi.

China is Iran’s best customer and has long been a diplomatic ally opposing sanctions. The blockage of the Strait of Hormuz is a serious long term problem for China which depends on Iranian and Saudi oil that passes through it. At the moment, China has enormous quantities of oil in reserve, but that will not last forever. Should China use its influence to press Iran to lift its blockade of the strait and negotiate seriously with the United States, that would be a huge gift to Trump. Oil prices would drop and the prospects for the world economy would improve, which of course would benefit China’s export-led economy as well.

At the very least, Xi will press Trump to delay arms sales to the island nation.

Would Xi drive a hard bargain with Trump, including Taiwan? Xi has been building up China’s military and has made no secret that he wants to burnish his legacy by finishing the Chinese Revolution that Mao started.

Trump can be expected to be ambiguous, which had been the traditional “strategic ambiguity” policy of the United States until President Biden asserted that the United States would defend Taiwan against attack. Trump has not repeated that assertion.

History shows that the relationship between Washington and Taipei is complicated. The only American president to visit Taiwan while in office was Dwight Eisenhower, during his final months in office in 1960. In 1954 and 1955, when Communist China shelled the tiny island of Quemoy, Eisenhower hinted he would use tactical nuclear weapons to protect the island controlled by Taiwan. In 1958, when China blockaded Quemoy to starve 100,000 Taiwanese troops, Eisenhower ordered the American navy to escort Taiwanese supply ships.

At the same time, Eisenhower discouraged Taiwanese leader Chiang Kai-shek from attempting to retake the mainland.

Tensions rose again when China attacked India in 1962, and President Kennedy prepared to back India. The strategic equation shifted when China tested its first nuclear bomb in 1964, and China began to openly challenge the Soviet Union for leadership of the Communist bloc.

President Nixon’s 1972 trip to China was the turning point in relations between the two countries. But it left Taiwan in the lurch. Nixon and Mao agreed that there was only one China, and that Taiwan was part of it. However, American military aid to Taiwan continued.

It would be difficult if not impossible for Trump to dispose of Taiwan, which now produces most of the world’s semiconductors and leading microchips that power everything from smartphones to modern military systems. Call it the “Silicon Shield.”

But just as Trump has backed away from Biden’s full-throated support of Taiwan, he could signal a longer range attitude of laissez-faire. A Trump encouragement for the mainland and the island to come to terms is very possible. The Taiwanese can’t be blamed for holding their breath. And maybe the Iranians as well.

Is Donald Trump playing Teddy Roosevelt? And if so, is he a century too late?

At the beginning of the 20th Century, the U.S. Navy sent the Great White Fleet 43,000 miles around the globe as a display of America’s growing military power and political reach. President Roosevelt personally waved goodbye from his presidential yacht. The world, especially Japan, took notice of America’s 16 powerful battleships.

Now President Trump wants the Navy to buy 15 new battleships by 2055 at a cost of $14.5 billion a pop. As a vanity project, this move recalls the original great fleet that set sail in 1907.

History offers a lesson here. Three decades after the great fleet set sail, the brilliant Japanese Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto advocated for a revamping of the Japanese fleet to favor aircraft carriers over battleships. Aircraft carriers offered the Japanese the range and flexibility to attack Pearl Harbor with planes that launched torpedoes. The American battleship fleet there was largely destroyed or badly damaged in the surprise attack, but Yamamoto quickly realized his blow was limited by the fact that American carriers were safely out to sea and untouched.

Those American carriers turned the tide of the war in the Pacific a few months later at the Battle of Midway. Their air power destroyed four Japanese carriers in a blow that Yamamoto knew doomed Japan’s prospects.

Battleships have been mostly museum pieces ever since. There are none on active duty in the American navy today — not since the USS Missouri was retired in 1992. Once the status symbols of big powers, battleships and their big guns were like floating artillery. Today, fighter jets and bombers can do more damage and missiles can be fired from smaller ships.

The new battleships would be outfitted with guided missiles, including missiles equipped with nuclear warheads. Presumably they would give the United States a strategic advantage in a nuclear war, since they could launch off the coast of say North Korea. That is a mission that is hard to contemplate, even unthinkable.

No doubt the new battleships would be deadly, but is this the kind of equipment needed in most kinds of modern warfare? As Ukraine and Iran have shown, drones and other asymmetric weaponry can effectively and cheaply battle goliaths dependent on heavy weaponry.

One final thought on Yamamoto. As clever as he was, he missed something important. Following Japanese naval doctrine at the time, Yamamoto viewed submarines as chiefly defensive weapons to protect the homeland from naval attack. He did not learn from the example of his German allies who used U-boats offensively to blockade and disrupt the British economy. A submarine blockade of Hawaii might have choked the American Pacific fleet and delayed Japan’s defeat. As it turned out, Japan’s submarines were helpless to protect the homeland against the American bombing campaign that finished the war.

The right weaponry must be matched with the right strategy.

The Strait of Hormuz has become the most talked about body of water in the world in recent weeks, and for good reasons. Now, another body of water is about to take center stage — a brackish lake called the Caspian Sea.

The New York Times reported on Saturday that Israeli fighter jets recently attacked an Iranian navy command outpost at the Caspian port of Bandar Anzali. The Israelis called the attack “one of the most significant” of its campaign against Iran. https://www.nytimes.com/2026/05/09/world/middleeast/caspian-sea-iran-russia.html

As the world’s largest inland body of water, the Caspian Sea has long provided a critical trade link between Iran and Russia, providing the two allies passage for everything from drone parts to animal feed to wheat and corn. Shipping of these goods and more through the Caspian has been on the rise since the war engulfed the Strait of Hormuz several hundred miles to the south.

The Caspian’s emergence on center stage comes as no surprise to scholars of the region. Most recently Russia’s Caspian fleet has played a role in the invasion of Ukraine by launching missiles at Ukrainian targets. During World War II the Caspian was a critical supply hub for Soviet oil from Baku in Azerbaijan up the Volga River to Soviet armies fighting the Germans. German invasion forces aimed to occupy Caspian shores for oil but their efforts to advance into the Caucasus was stopped by the Soviets in ferocious fighting.

Centuries earlier local kings competed for power in and around the Caspian, with rebellions and separatist movements sprouting up into modern times.

With the Strait of Hormuz blockaded by both the United States and Iran, critical goods for the Iranian economy that once flowed through the Strait can now be expected to be redirected through the Caspian more and more. Caspian ports may benefit, but combat closer to Russia is potentially troublesome.

Since the United States navy does not operate in the Caspian, there is not much the Trump administration can do about shipping there, unless the air campaign is to be expanded. That would be a risk Trump might not choose to take.

The regimes of Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi might still be around today if only they had had nuclear weapons. There is no more powerful insurance policy for a dictator. Look no farther than North Korea.

That has been the overriding rationale for Iran to enrich uranium and develop missile capability to launch devastating destruction against any enemy attempting regime change in Tehran. Armed with nukes, the thinking goes, no one — not Israel, not the United States — would mess with the Islamic regime.

But nukes of course are the bluntest of instruments. A nuclear attack on Israel, for instance, would be a suicide mission for the Islamic regime. So it is unusable. But it would remain a deterrence, though having a small nuclear arsenal could invite a preemptive strike in a moment of extreme crisis.

Meanwhile, an attack on Israel would kill countless Palestinians and jeopardize the Al-Aqsa mosque on the Temple Mount in East Jerusalem, one of the holiest sites in Islam. Destroying, or even desecrating, that site ought to be unthinkable.

Nevertheless a nuclear program potentially gives Iran leverage. What else does Iran have to protect itself from more powerful outside forces? Now we know the answer.

The current standoff between Iran and the United States and Israel shows that Iran does have another card to play: blockading the Strait of Hormuz. Iran can hold the world economy hostage without risking nuclear retaliation. No matter how the current crisis is settled, Iran can always hold the Strait in its back pocket. No big navy or air force is needed, we now know. Small boats can attack shipping with rockets or lay mines.

This powerful weapon of course is in conflict with international law protecting free passage on the seas. But that is hardly a big concern for Iran when its very survival is at stake.

As troubling as this development may be, it potentially opens the way to a negotiation. If Iran has credible non-nuclear leverage, maybe it can negotiate to give up its buried enriched uranium and right to enrich uranium in the future. The United States would need to accept that Iran would have some control over the Strait, perhaps with some kind of toll system, maybe in concert with Oman and other Gulf states.

To be sure, that compromise has its drawbacks. It is limited if it guarantees the survival of the regime and its support for proxies like Hamas and Hezbollah. The only other possibility that I can see would be a nuclear agreement similar to the one that the Obama Administration negotiated. That would probably be a hard pill for President Trump to swallow, but so would giving ultimate power over Persian Gulf shipping to Iran.

With the faceoff between Iran and the United States approaching a climax in the Strait of Hormuz and no end in sight from the Russian invasion of Ukraine, it is easy to lose track of developments in Africa.

But something unexpected and significant is happening in impoverished, landlocked Mali, where once again Russia’s image of strength is being seriously challenged.

In recent days Russian mercenaries and Mali’s Russian-supported army have surrendered the northern settlement of Tessalit, strategic for its airfield. In their coordinated assaults the separatists and their Islamist allies have surrounded the capital of Bamako. Mali’s defense minister has been killed in the fighting.

Russia’s declining fortunes in Mali follow the defeat of the allied Syrian Assad regime and the mounting death toll of Moscow’s troops in Ukraine, now totaling well over 1 million. With no victory in sight. Russia now depends on African recruits and North Koreans to supplement its forces in Ukraine.

Recall how the Soviet Union collapsed in the 1990s. The Soviets overextended themselves — from Cuba to Ethiopia to Angola and, of course, Afghanistan. The Soviet economy and army could not sustain so large an empire, and Russia’s economy is once again stressed.

Mali may seem like small potatoes in global politics but Russia over the last five years has replaced French and U.N. forces with an estimated 2,000 mercenaries providing Mali’s army with training, weapons and combat support. The Russians reportedly seek access to resources such as gold, and are likewise engaged in nearby Burkina Faso and Niger. Russia views Africa as a source for critical minerals like uranium and cobalt.

Foreign military disasters have been instrumental in causing historic internal changes in Russia over at least three centuries. The defeat in the Russo-Japanese War preceded the Revolution of 1905, the defeat in World War I preceded the Bolshevik Revolution, and the defeat in Afghanistan preceded the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Putin knows this, which is why he is unwilling to withdraw from Ukraine and why many in Western Europe fear Putin may invade a tiny neighbor to prove he is not a paper tiger.

In the face of this, President Trump wants to withdraw troops from Germany. That is one thing Putin can smile about.

By Clifford Krauss

The special relationship. Standing shoulder to shoulder during World Wars I and II and, more recently, in Iraq and Afghanistan. The spat between President Trump and Prime Minister Keir Starmer feels like an exception to the rule.

But not entirely. When Vice President Vance neglected to join in applause as King Charles called for collective support for Ukraine and the environment, he wore his true opinions on his sleeve. Most members of Congress cheered, but pure Maga sees the world differently.

Truth be told, the two countries are not always on the same page. Washington waited years to enter World War I and never joined London in its war on the Ottoman Empire. When Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, Churchill worried that the United States might declare war on Japan alone and not Germany. Hitler decided the issue by declaring war on the United States first, one of his many critical mistakes.

When it comes to the Middle East, President Eisenhower let Britain down during the 1956 Suez crisis, arguably thrusting a dagger into the declining British empire. When Britain, France and Israel invaded Egypt to sustain British control of the Suez Canal and undercut Egyptian nationalist leader Gamal Abdel Nasser, Eisenhower was outraged. Eisenhower saw the intervention as a distraction for the West as it opposed the Soviet intervention in Hungary.

Eisenhower played hardball, threatening to sell British bonds to sink the British pound. Prime Minister Anthony Eden, formerly foreign minister during World War II, was forced to back down and obey a United Nations ceasefire.

Soon after, Eisenhower issued the Eisenhower Doctrine to protect the Middle East from Soviet aggression in a move that formally replaced Britain’s long held dominance in the region. Most historians, at least American historians, think Eisenhower did the right thing though Nasser eventually tilted to the Soviets anyway.

It is no wonder that King Charles neglected to mention Suez in his speech to Congress. But maybe, just maybe, Britain’s lack of support for Trump’s war on Iran is a sweet revenge of sorts.

By Clifford Krauss

“You have the watches but we have the time,” is a quote attributed to the Taliban mocking Americans stuck in the Afghanistan quagmire a few years back.

Now that the United States is stuck in another Middle East war, does Washington again have the clock but not enough time? The answer appears to be a murky maybe.

Some days President Trump says he is in no hurry to settle the conflict with Iran, and is ready to go back to bombing while pressing ahead with the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. On other days, especially when he wants to calm the stock market, the president appears anxious to find an off-ramp from his Iran adventure. Ready to send negotiators, including his Vice President, to Pakistan to seek a grand bargain at the right moment, he tells us victory is near, or already won.

Unfortunately the Iranians also have a say, and they appear steadfast in their commitment to their nuclear program and their willingness to block sea traffic in the Persian Gulf as their ultimate trump card. Nevertheless there are times when the Iranians, or at least some of their leaders, do seem to want a deal, sending their emissaries to Pakistan, Oman and even Russia. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard, who have the guns, seem to have other ideas however.

Who will blink first, and how long will it take?

As oil and gasoline prices rise with midterm elections approaching, Republicans in Congress fear for their seats. Shortages of oil, natural gas and fertilizer put the entire global economy at risk, and that means shrunken markets for American exports. How long will stock market investors wait before they start selling their shares?

The Iranians have their own worries, of course, and they may well be even weightier. As long as the Strait of Hormuz is closed, Iran can’t export most of its oil. Its currency is in the tank, prices of goods are already rising, and public discontent is rampant.

Iran has a China problem as well. China relies on Iranian oil. While it has reserves, at some point China may be forced to use its weight to free up Iranian energy. Iran is already isolated with Europe, Asia and especially the developing world desperately in need of Iranian oil to be brought back on the market.

The canary in the coal mine may be Kharg Island, the Persian Gulf island northwest of the Strait of Hormuz where Iran stores most of its oil for export. The island is reportedly near its storage capacity, forcing Iran to take aging tankers out of mothballs for added storage. Once Iran runs out of places to put its oil, it will have to shut in its wells, which can not only damage its critical production infrastructure but also force lower production for months.

That is a sequence no Iranian government, no matter how hardline, can easily swallow.

By Clifford Krauss

All eyes are now on the Strait of Hormuz, which is effectively being blockaded by both Iran and the United States to the detriment of the entire world economy. But the strait is maybe the easiest issue to resolve in the current crisis, in part because a negotiated settlement would simply return the strategic waterway to the kind of commerce that flowed freely before the war began.

What is particularly complex is the nuclear issue. The United States (and Israel) want Iran’s nuclear program not only put on hold, but entirely abandoned. To remove Iran’s nuclear material is one problem. Where to put it is another. Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium is probably mostly buried deep underground following the June B-2 bombings aimed at obliterating Iran’s nuclear program.

First a little history:

Under the 2015 nuclear agreement negotiated by the Obama Administration, Iran shipped 25,000 pounds of enriched uranium to Russia, greatly reducing Iran’s stockpile and lengthening the breakout time for building a bomb to at least a year. After President Trump withdrew from the agreement in 2018, Iran began enriching and stockpiling again. By 2026, Iran had withdrawn from the agreement completely. Since last June’s American and Israeli bombing campaign, Iran has not apparently been able to enrich. There may be more scattered materials around the country, and international inspectors have lost access to verify stockpiles.

It has long been official American policy that Iran will never be permitted to have a nuclear bomb, and President Trump has insisted on the removal of Iran’s enriched uranium. That is easier said than done. First there would probably need to be a negotiated agreement for American technicians to remove the material. Otherwise military force will be needed to get to the nuclear sites and protect the technicians as they perform their delicate task. The operation could take months, and under the threat of attack.

Russia may be willing to take enriched uranium again, but given the uneasy relationship between the United States and Russia verification would be difficult. The United States would most likely prefer to take the nuclear material itself for safe storage. After the Soviet Union collapsed in the 1990s, the United States removed or bought nuclear materials from Kazakhstan and Georgia for safe storage in Scotland and blending for use in American nuclear power plants.

Short of complete Iranian surrender, Tehran cannot be expected to allow its nuclear material to be shipped to the United States. The symbolism would probably be unacceptable. Another possibility, likely more palatable to Iran, would be to ship the material to nearby Kazakhstan. There the International Atomic Energy Agency runs its Low-Enriched Uranium Bank established as a refuge for nuclear materials to stem nuclear proliferation. In exchange, the bank could provide Iran with access to fuel for civilian use.

The complexity of this operation will take a lot of negotiating. Opening the strait of Hormuz will be a necessary first step.

By Clifford Krauss

Is President Trump completely unhinged when he threatens to annihilate Iranian civilization?

Maybe yes, maybe no. And that is the point. Trump is clearly trying to scare the Iranians to make a deal, and he might just succeed in reopening the Strait of Hormuz and limiting their nuclear program.

He is up against a culture that views backing down before a bully as cowardly and dishonorable. Hardliners may hit back and Iran and the United States could climb further up the escalation ladder. Still, negotiations are ongoing.

Trump is clearly not the first leader to employ apparent irrationality as a muscular tool. The most recent case in American history is President Richard Nixon, who wanted the Soviets and North Vietnamese to think he was ready to employ unthinkable force to end the Vietnam War. Playing chicken with the highest stakes in 1969, Nixon went so far as to order a secret global nuclear readiness test. More than a dozen B-52 bombers armed with thermonuclear weapons flew over the Arctic polar cap for three days close enough to Soviet territory to cause goosebumps in the Kremlin.

National Security Advisor and later Secretary of State Henry Kissinger whispered to adversaries that Nixon could be out of control so they had to bend. Kissinger, of course, was behind the ruse all along.

In the end, the Russians and Vietnamese didn’t bend and Nixon cooled down to launch detente with the Soviets. The Vietnam War, of course, was a lost cause.

Others have tried the madman theory with mixed results. President Eisenhower hinted that atomic weapons could be used against the Chinese and North Koreans if negotiations did not settle the Korean War. The war did cool down.

Others who tried to use the technique have included Adolf Hitler, Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi, all arguably mad themselves. None of them today would qualify for the hall of fame of successful leaders, but they did make history.

The next few days may tell whether the madman theory of geopolitics could work this time or should be whisked into the dust bin of history one more time, though probably not the last.

By Clifford Krauss

The announcement by President Trump that Israel and Lebanon have agreed to a temporary ceasefire is welcome news, and perhaps a step forward to resolving the Iran crisis and reopening the Strait of Hormuz.

Iran had insisted Israel stop its attacks in Lebanon, but will Tehran view the tentative halt to fighting as a true path to piece or merely a tactical victory to relieve pressure on Hezbollah, its ally and proxy? Hezbollah was left out of the Israeli-Lebanese talks, and how it reacts remains to be seen.

Direct talks between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Lebanese President Joseph Aoun would be historic since the two countries have technically been at war since Israel’s birth in 1948.

But before champagne corks pop, it is worth noting Iran’s grip on Lebanon going back to the early1980s. At that time Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini sought to export his religious ideology to Lebanon, where the large Shia community was a breeding ground for militias. Khomeini sent his Islamic Revolutionary Guard to Lebanon to train and arm the militias which eventually coalesced as Hezbollah.

Hezbollah won adherents resisting the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon between 1985 and 2000, with active Iranian encouragement and support. Over time Hezbollah proved itself to be a loyal and mostly obedient proxy, recognizing Khomeini as its supreme leader. Its been shelling and otherwise attacking Israel’s northern communities on and off ever since, while exerting power independent of the Lebanese state. Coordinating with Iran, it offered critical military support to Syria’s Bashar al-Assad until his overthrow in 2024. It has been responsible for bombings and kidnappings around the region and as far away as South America.

Iran’s Islamic leadership looks to its Lebanese proxy as more than an alliance. The roots of the relationship go back many centuries, way back to Iran’s Safavid dynasty of the 16th Century. In 1501, Shah Ismail I launched a forced conversion campaign throughout Iran, switching the country’s religious beliefs from Sunni to Shia Islam. His effort was designed to distance and distinguish his people from the Ottoman Empire, where Sunni Islam was dominant.

Shah Ismail turned to southern Lebanon, the center of Shiite scholarship, for guidance and Lebanese clerics traveled to Iran (as well as Iraq) to spread their teachings. Those religious and cultural ties remain the ideological backbone of the modern Iran and Hezbollah relationship.

Iran has demanded that Israel stop its attacks on Lebanon as a condition for a peaceful resolution to the Gulf crisis. Will Hezbollah go along and cease its attacks on Israel? Watch Tehran for the answer.

By Clifford Krauss

Short of a nuclear weapon, the Strait of Hormuz offers Iran it’s most potent strategic advantage. Even after it has taken a beating militarily in recent weeks, it can paralyze world commerce in oil, natural gas and fertilizer. With its navy and air force badly damaged, it can still attempt to neutralize the United States’ military superiority with sabotage attacks from drones and fast boats laying mines.

The Trump administration evidently didn’t take this threat seriously, thinking the Iranian regime would quickly collapse or surrender. Iran is wounded but its shadow over the strait is resilient. All the American and Israeli bombs that have been dropped have left Iran with few military options other than to mine the waterway or otherwise interfere with sea traffic. Washington’s response ironically is to blockade the strait itself, hardly an ideal response.

What does history tell us? Actually, we are in uncharted territory. The strait has never been fully blocked, although there have been several disruptions that forced Washington to respond.

President Carter declared that the United States would use military force if necessary to prevent a foreign power from intervening in the Persian Gulf. The doctrine was designed to deter the Soviet Union during the Cold War. That was followed by the “Reagan Corollary” which included protecting Saudi Arabia from any threats to its oil fields. Together the two policy declarations underscored the centrality of Persian Gulf Oil to American interests in the Middle East.

When Iran and Iraq went to war Reagan deployed the navy to protect Kuwaiti oil tanker convoys (reflagged with American flags) between 1987 and 1988. Most dramatically, the American Navy destroyed two Iranian oil platforms and heavily damaged six Iranian naval vessels. The Iranians backed down. There have been several skirmishes between Iranian and American war ships since then, and the world has relied on the American navy to keep the strait open.

Even China, which depends on Persian Gulf oil to keep its economy running, effectively depends on the American navy for its energy security. Its a relationship of convenience rarely commented on. China is closely watching the current crisis and can be expected to use its diplomatic muscle to help reopen the strait for its own good. Since China keeps its stocks of oil reserves plentiful, there is in no rush for it to act immediately. But act it will, perhaps in concert with Washington.

That is one reason the strait will probably reopen sooner rather than later. Will Iran get something in return for the opening, given that the strait is its single most important weapon or bargaining chip? Or will Iran be forced to back off by military pressure?

A lot of damage has already been done, and not only to Iran. It will take time for energy prices to come back to levels prior to the war, and for damages to energy infrastructure to be repaired. More lasting may be the reputational damage to the Gulf states like the United Arab Emirates and Qatar which no longer appear to be safe havens for investment and tourism.

No matter how many times Washington tries to pivot, an insecure Persian Gulf is likely to remain a costly distraction.

By Clifford Krauss

The newly reported ceasefire between the United States, Israel and Iran may or may not hold, and beyond the initial two weeks predictions of eventual outcomes remain foggy. Just hours after the agreement, Iran turned back shipping through the Strait of Hormuz to pressure Israel to cease hostilities in Lebanon. And the shooting around the Gulf has not stopped.

What has been accomplished?

The Iranian regime has established its power over the strait, flexing its muscle over the world economy. It retains its enriched uranium. It has survived. Still, its leadership, navy, air force and weaponry have been decimated.

President Trump has retreated; though he will no doubt eventually declare victory as he always does. The U.S. economy has been damaged, and Republicans are not helped by higher gasoline prices heading into the midterms. American alliances have been further strained. Nevertheless, Iran is militarily weaker.

There will be no shortage of scorekeepers. But the results of the war are ambiguous so far, and may well remain so. That’s not unusual. The Korean War of the 1950s has still not been settled. The United States and its allies pushed back the North Korean and Chinese invasion of South Korea, but North Korea today remains a threat, a nuclear one at that. More recently Russia invaded Ukraine, in what at first appeared to be a geopolitical layup. That war grinds on, with both sides bleeding and there is no end in sight. Gaza is destroyed, but its future remains hopelessly undefined and a settlement between Israel and the Palestinians never appeared more unlikely.

Defining history is no easy task because outcomes are frequently anything but neat. In 1972 during his historic trip to China, President Nixon asked Premier Zhou Enlai to assess the impact of the French Revolution. The Chinese leader famously responded, “Its too early to tell.” Perhaps lost in translation was which French revolution Zhou was referring to — the revolution of the 18th Century or the more recent 1968 Paris student revolt. Either way, historians still debate their meanings.

The current Gulf war may wind down, or not. Either way President Trump and the Iranian leadership will herald their performances. They will posture and maneuver for advantage over the coming weeks. The final chapter of Iran’s Islamic Revolution has not been written, and the regime may yet survive beyond the Trump presidency.

By Clifford Krauss

President Trump promises to pound Iran back to the Stone Age with more bombs and missiles. But will the Islamic Revolutionary Guard surrender under the pressure of far superior military force? And if not, are they crazy as Trump suggests?

Religion may be at the core of the answer. In Shia Islam martyrdom shapes the dominant world view. Supreme sacrifice is sacred and central to the ideology of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard that effectively now controls Iran and its resistance to the United States and Israel. Compromise is equated with betrayal, and enemies of the Islamic regime are considered enemies of God.

As an ideology, that is strong stuff when fighting a war. The roots of this ideology go way back to the Seventh Century martyrdom of Imam Hussayn Ibn Ali, the grandson of the Prophet Mohammad who is known as “Leader of Martyrs.” Hussayn refused to accept the leadership of Yazid I as ruler of the caliphate (though not a direct descendent of Mohammad), claiming he was a corrupt usurper and tyrant unworthy of leading Islam. He and his small band of followers were killed in the battle of Karbala and Hussayn was decapitated and trampled by horses.

Hussayn is not considered a loser. His death has been commemorated as the grandest of sacrifices ever since — an example to be followed.

Islamic Revolutionary Guard members are indoctrinated to believe Hussayn exemplifies how a warrior must fight on regardless of the odds. Hussayn was killed but his sect of Islam lived on. The defeat at Karbala is something akin to the Alamo, a battle lost but one that inspired eventual victory.

In President Trump’s world view, Iran doesn’t have the cards. Regardless of their blockage of the Strait of Hormuz, and stranglehold over the global economy, Iran’s rulers cannot possibly stand up to American and Israeli power. Those who remember Hussayn have other ideas. To their way of thinking, they can’t lose, one way or the other.

By Clifford Krauss

Remember the days when the nuclear threat came from North Korea? President Trump, new to the job in 2017, threatened “fire and fury” in response to the pariah state’s accelerating missile and nuclear tests. North Korea would never be allowed to have the capability of shooting nukes at the American homeland, we were promised.

To the relief of all, President Trump met North Korean leader Kim Jong Un (and the two supposedly “fell in love”) at the first-ever leader summit in Singapore in 2018. They met again the following year in Hanoi. Trump even became the first sitting president to walk through the demilitarized zone into North Korean territory.

But negotiations stalled. North Korea still has nukes. And it continues to develop long range missiles to deliver them. The world would be safer if this weren’t true.

Lesson learned: Trump can learn to live with an enemy that has nukes when he has no other choice. As aggressively hostile North Korea is to South Korea and the United States, it apparently views its nuclear capability as an insurance policy more than as an offensive weapon. (It also knows it faces sure annihilation if it launches.)

Iran had no such insurance, and Trump pounced. But unless the Iranian regime cracks — which is not likely at least in the immediate future — Trump will need to settle again for at best a draw. The reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, which was open before the hostilities, must now be the first priority to safeguard the world economy. Then, if Iran attempts to break out with a bomb, the United States and Israel can be expected to attack again.

For now, the Iranian regime is stalling for time and hopes to survive to fight another day.

What is the lesson for Iran’s weakened regime, and whatever remains of its leadership? One strong and regrettable possibility is that somehow acquiring nukes is the best way to avert a future American and Israeli attack. There remains enriched uranium and scientific expertise for Iran to rebuild its nuclear program. Maybe not today, but in the future. The Iran problem may be with us for another generation or more.

The nuclear genie is out. India and Pakistan, sworn enemies for decades, have nukes pointed at each other, as the United States and Russia have had for years. Ukraine gave up its nukes when the Soviet Union crumbled, and the result has not been pretty. Proliferation has been slow, thankfully, but nuclear war remains a grave threat.

The sad truth is nukes aren’t going anywhere.

If the new Ayatollah emerges, will he meet with Trump someday? Seems improbable but it’s happened before in the case of North Korea. It would be better if it were to happen before Iran acquired a bomb.

By Clifford Krauss

Analysts find many similarities in these two leaders who govern very different countries. They are authoritarians. They are narcissists. They are loyal only to themselves. Or so the argument goes.

I find something more important, at least at this crucial moment. Neither Trump nor Putin can afford to lose. For Putin, his fortunes rest on Ukraine; for Trump, Iran.

Putin knows that every major social and political reform of Russia has come after a major defeat in war. Russia’s defeat in the Crimean War forced Czar Alexander II to modernize, directly leading to the abolition of serfdom in 1861. The defeat in the Russo-Japanese War led to the Revolution of 1905, followed by the defeat in World War I which catalyzed the Bolshevik Revolution. More recently the defeat in Afghanistan contributed mightily to the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Where does that leave Putin in Ukraine? He has already failed in his initial goal of destroying an independent state in Kiev. Now he is just holding on, hoping to grasp enough territory to claim victory from a negotiated settlement. One way or another, Russia has already weakened economically and militarily. Putin looks anything but strong.

Will Trump’s attack on Iran be his unforced error? It is too soon to tell. The Iranian regime might still collapse, the Strait of Hormuz could be reopened, oil prices might fall, and Trump could look victorious.

However, victory won’t come easily. It must include not only the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz but a change in the Iranian regime, removing or at least reducing a future nuclear threat. Anything less will look like a defeat for Trump, losses in the Midterms and the president’s own political standing. Strains on Maga would intensify.

Without probing Trump’s psychology, I would bet the president will double down first — and escalate — like Putin. His presidency is at stake.

History doesn’t exactly repeat itself, but empires inevitably rise and fall, failed leaders confuse tactics with strategy, social justice movements rise and spark reactions. Human nature does not change; greed, ambition and hunger for raw power are frequently part of the DNA of certain leaders, leading to hubris and overreach.

My Mirror of History is going to provide a running letter reflecting on how today’s events reflect the past.

I have been a reporter for more than 40 years, and a student of history, particularly of the United States, Latin America and the Middle East, and I have traveled widely for the Wall Street Journal and the New York Times.

My first post inevitably is about the crisis in the Middle East, and how it will inevitably impact our politics. The fog now is very deep, making the outcome of the United States-Israeli attack on Iran impossible to predict precisely. The Iranian regime could crack tomorrow or hang on and control the Strait of Hormuz for months or years. Whatever the outcome, this conflict will largely define the rest of the Trump years, especially if he fails at what was clearly his original goal: Iran regime change and denuclearization.

President Trump would appear to have nothing in common with President Jimmy Carter; but like Carter, Trump appears engaged in a battle with the Iranian regime that will be very difficult to settle in his favor. Carter was taken by surprise by the Islamic Revolution and responded slowly and weakly. Trump miscalculated to think the Iranian regime would quickly surrender and now is struggling to get out of Persian Gulf quicksand.

The hostage taking and failed rescue mission doomed Carter’s presidency, and the regime cruelly did not release the American hostages until the moment Carter left office. With the mounting economic and political damage, Trump has strong reasons to settle and declare victory. But will the Iranians let him or fight on. At some point, they might just collapse. But what regime would replace this one, anyway?

The United States and Israel can pummel Iran’s air force and navy, but Iran appears committed to keeping its enriched uranium. Its main leverage—control over the Strait of Hormuz, which impacts global supplies of oil, gas, and fertilizer—is significant for nearly every nation. A negotiated or military solution must include the opening of the strait. But how? Escalation seems to be the only likely answer, and Iran appears to have the will and resources to resist and destroy vital energy infrastructure critical to the world economy. Casualties could be high.

This is a powerful enemy because it has nothing to lose. The Iranian political leadership, whatever is left of it, does not have the support of its population and has no future in defeat. Their mix of religion and politics is a toxic and intoxicating brew, as it has always been through history no matter what the faith.

That is one mirror of history. Another is the limits of power of this president, whatever the weaponry at his disposal. Remember Jimmy Carter, as the Iranian regime does. Just as they humiliated Carter, they are trying to humiliate Trump. And they might just succeed again.